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NEW ZEALAND
Eyes on New Zealand
Introduction1
New Zealand is a small country, with a population 
of less than five million, situated in the far reach-
es of the southern hemisphere. But its physical 
remoteness belies a critical role in the powerful 
international intelligence alliance known as the 
“Five Eyes”,2 which has been at the heart of global 
controversy about mass surveillance. This report 
outlines the remarkable story of how an interna-
tional police raid for alleged copyright infringement 
activities ultimately became a story of illegal spying 
on New Zealanders, and political deals on revised 
surveillance laws, while precipitating proposals for 
a Digital Rights and Freedoms Bill and resulting in 
the creation of a new political party. We outline how 
civil society has tried to respond, and suggest ac-
tion points for the future, bearing in mind that this 
incredible story is not yet over.
Background: New Zealand’s role  
in the Five Eyes
The impact of the revelations of mass surveillance 
and New Zealand’s role must be seen against the 
backdrop of the country’s role in the Five Eyes alli-
ance. Nicky Hager, New Zealand’s most prominent 
investigative journalist, says “for the most part 
[New Zealand’s role in the Five Eyes] was an acci-
dent of history.”3 Arising from intelligence-sharing 
agreements among five countries during and after 
World War II, the main agency responsible for its 
day-to-day operations in New Zealand is the 
1 TechLiberty is a New Zealand group advocating for civil liberties 
online: www.techliberty.org.nz  
2 The “Five Eyes” countries are New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. The alliance 
operates an integrated global surveillance arrangement that 
covers the majority of the worlds’ communications. For an overview 
of legal arrangements see: APC et al. (2014). Joint Submission in 
Connection with General Assembly Resolution 67/167, “The right 
to privacy in the digital age”. https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/
submission-office-high-commissioner-human-rights-r 
3 Hager, N. (1996). Secret power: New Zealand’s Role in the 
International Spy Network. Port Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing, p. 
58.
Government Communications Security Bureau 
(GCSB).4 
A key aspect of this intelligence-sharing regime 
is a legal framework that provides differing levels of 
protections for internal (national) versus external 
(extraterritorial) communications, or those relating 
to national citizens versus non-nationals. This frame-
work discriminates on grounds of national origin, and 
in doing so purports to step around human rights pro-
tections from interferences with the right to privacy of 
communications by the governments of the Five Eyes, 
claiming that such protections apply only to nationals 
or those within their territorial jurisdiction.5 
Historically, the main purpose of the GCSB un-
der this legal framework has been to spy on our 
neighbours in Asia and the South Pacific on behalf 
of the Five Eyes. This enabled the GCSB to claim that 
it did not spy on New Zealand citizens or permanent 
residents. Public assurances to this effect were giv-
en on a number of occasions by both the GCSB and 
the New Zealand government.6 
Case study: Mega Upload – the move  
to domestic surveillance
In 2012 the New Zealand Police assisted the United 
States of America’s Federal Bureau of Intelligence 
(FBI) to carry out a raid on the house of Mr Kim Dot-
com, founder of Mega Upload, an online file-sharing 
platform. Mr Dotcom had migrated to New Zealand 
from Hong Kong and was living in New Zealand legal-
ly as a permanent resident. The extraordinary raid of 
the house (replete with a helicopter bringing armed 
police officers into the house grounds to seize com-
puters and other property), the seizure of the Mega 
Upload online service, and Mr Dotcom’s subsequent 
arrest and criminal prosecution, received huge media 
attention both in New Zealand and overseas.7
Mr Dotcom is an enigmatic figure, who has main-
tained a vigorous defence of all charges and high 
and consistent media presence through public en-
4 The first law authorising its operations was in 1977, followed by 
the Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003.
5 APC et al. (2014). Op. cit., Appendix 1.
6 See also Hager, N. (2013, April 10). Who is really responsible for 
the GCSB shennanigans? Pundit. www.pundit.co.nz/content/who-
is-really-responsible-for-the-gcsb-shenanigans  
7 For an overview of the case, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Megaupload_legal_case 
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gagement against leading politicians, including the 
prime minister. There are many factors to the case 
which remain outstanding – extradition issues, valid-
ity of search warrants, and many other legal matters 
outside the scope of this report. However, in relation 
to surveillance issues, the case against Mr Dotcom 
revealed that the GCSB had been spying on him and 
sharing information from its activities with New Zea-
land law enforcement officers who were also dealing 
with the FBI in the investigation of Mega Upload. 
Public outrage followed the discovery that the GCSB 
were in fact spying on New Zealanders and resulted 
in the prime minister establishing an independent in-
vestigation by Rebecca Kitteridge. 
The Kitteridge Report8 revealed that the GCSB 
activity was not an isolated case: in fact 88 un-
named New Zealanders had been spied on over 
many years.9 The report concluded that the GCSB 
based their operations on a faulty interpretation of 
the relevant New Zealand law (for example, they be-
lieved the prohibition on spying did not apply where 
there was a warrant and did not apply to “metada-
ta” because metadata was not a “communication”), 
and that the law was unclear and therefore the 
GCSB were not at fault.10 Various recommendations 
were made for changing GCSB operations and law.
Prime Minister John Key immediately responded 
that the report made “sobering reading” and further: 
“I am embarrassed to say that I heard the unequivo-
cal assurances and read the clear prohibition in the 
GCSB legislation, and I believed that they did not spy 
on New Zealanders. But it turns out they have been 
regularly spying on New Zealanders from before 2003 
and since. They have seriously let down the public.”11 
Signalling a need for law reform, the prime minister 
also said: “In addition, the Act governing the GCSB is 
not fit for purpose and probably never has been.”12
The Kitteridge Report had been leaked, much to 
the fury of government ministers, and a parliamentary 
inquiry was launched. The prime suspect was Peter 
Dunne, a parliamentarian holding a single vote sup-
porting the coalition government. Data about both 
Dunne’s movements and those of journalists in the par-
liamentary precinct (from security card swipe records 
at various doors in different buildings) were handed to 
the investigation. Dunne and journalist Andrea Vance’s 
8 Kitteridge, R. (2013). Review of Compliance at the GCSB. www.
gcsb.govt.nz/news/publications 
9 Ibid. 
10 Bennett, A. (2013, April 9). CSB report: 88 cases of possible illegal 
spying uncovered. New Zealand Herald. www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/
news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10876424  




private phone records and emails from a three-month 
period were also provided to the investigation, without 
their knowledge or consent. These actions were widely 
seen as an attack on privacy and press freedom, spark-
ing intense commentary from local journalists and 
media outlets. Dunne denied he was the source of the 
leak and asserted his rights to privacy,13 but was forced 
to resign his ministerial portfolio.14
Throughout this time, the Snowden revelations 
also kept coming, contributing to ongoing media 
focus and providing a wider global backdrop to the 
GCSB scandal and the proposed law reforms. 
It was in this context that two new laws were in-
troduced. The first, the GCSB Bill, was designed to 
restructure the GCSB and establish its legal basis 
more clearly. But the new laws went much further, 
retrospectively validating the GCSB action and 
fundamentally shifting the permitted surveillance 
activities to include surveillance of New Zealand 
citizens. Rather than clarifying that the GCSB could 
not spy on New Zealanders, the new law simply 
extended the authority to do so and validated the 
previously unlawful activity, clearly violating priva-
cy rights. There was widespread consternation and 
opposition from legal groups, the technical com-
munity, business, human rights organisations and 
community organisations. The New Zealand human 
rights commission also took the unusual step of 
preparing a separate report for the prime minister 
highlighting serious concerns with the proposals.
The second law, the Telecommunications In-
terception Capability and Security Act (TICS), gave 
sweeping new powers to the GCSB, making new 
network security measures by all network operators 
including telecommunications companies, such as 
submission of security measures to the newly consti-
tuted GCSB. Thomas Beagle from Tech Liberty noted: 
The [TICS] bill codifies the government’s asser-
tion that all digital communications (which is 
increasingly becoming equivalent to “all commu-
nications”) must be accessible by government 
agencies. The limits imposed are minimal and 
laws such as the GCSB Act override any limits in-
cluded in TICS. Furthermore, to ensure that the 
government can do this, the GCSB will now have 
oversight of the design and operation of New 
Zealand’s communications networks. They will 
be able to veto any decision made by the network 
13 Shuttleworth, K. (2013, July 30). Reports phone records released. 
New Zealand Herald. www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_
id=1&objectid=10905495  
14 Burr, L. (2013, June 7). Peter Dunne resigns as minister. 3 News. 
www.3news.co.nz/Peter-Dunne-resigns-as-minister/tabid/1607/
articleID/300658/Default.aspx  
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operators that might impact on security or, more 
likely, limit their ability to spy as they see fit.15 
Under the TICS, the GCSB now has the ability to ap-
prove or refuse to approve all significant changes to 
New Zealand’s telecommunications infrastructure. 
This new power far exceeds any role of the GCSB 
in the Five Eyes, extending its oversight to business 
and other private sector activities.
At the same time as these two new laws were 
being passed, a new internet censorship law aimed 
at harmful online speech, the Harmful Digital Com-
munications Bill, was also before parliament.16 The 
local internet community worked hard to respond 
to these new measures, including bringing national 
attention to concerns about the role of New Zealand 
in the Five Eyes, highlighting human rights concerns 
and the need for limitations on human rights only in 
exceptional and narrow circumstances, in line with 
the 13 International Principles on the Application of 
Human Rights to Communications Surveillance.17
The degree of public interest was enormous. Large 
public meetings and street rallies were held through-
out the country, fuelled by the Snowden revelations 
and leaks of information about the role of New Zea-
land in the Five Eyes. Thousands of people rallied, 
started and joined online campaigns, with both online 
and offline media and journalists engaging.
Overall, it was an intense period of constant 
media coverage and political focus. At times develop-
ments happened daily, even hourly, making it difficult 
to maintain an overview of what was happening, how 
developments were related and to think strategically 
about how to respond. Views were also divided: some 
thought privacy issues were not relevant in an internet 
age; others considered it was legitimate for the gov-
ernment to carry out surveillance. Despite widespread 
public opposition to the GCSB Bill, the prime minister 
went so far as to claim that New Zealanders cared 
more about how many fish they were allowed to catch 
than they did about their online privacy.18
By the end of 2013 both the GCSB and TICS 
Bills were law and campaigns to counter them had 
proved ineffective. But the awareness of internet-
related policy issues had grown enormously. In 
15 Tech Liberty. (2013 November 5). TICS - Second spy law passes. 
Tech Liberty. techliberty.org.nz/tag/gcsb
16 The Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2012 deals with harmful 
online content and has been reported back from Select Committee. 
It is not expected to become law until 2015. See also Paton, L. and 
Liddicoat, J. (2013). New Zealand. In APC and Hivos, Global Information 
Society Watch 2013: Women’s rights, gender and ICTs. www.giswatch.
org/en/country-report/womens-rights-gender/new-zealand 
17  www.necessaryandproportionate.org  
18 John Key, press conference, 12 August 2013. www.3news.co.nz/
Key-NZers-care-more-about-snapper-than-GCSB/tabid/817/
articleID/308665/Default.aspx 
March 2014 the main political opposition, the La-
bour Party, announced plans for a new Digital Bill of 
Rights.19 Within weeks Gareth Hughes, a Greens po-
litical party member of parliament, launched a new 
Digital Rights and Freedoms Bill,20 drawing heavily 
on the global civil society Charter of Internet Rights 
and Principles,21 with protections for encryption, 
privacy and freedom from search, surveillance and 
interception of communications.
Implications 
The GCSB and TICS laws were passed, while New 
Zealand continues to affirm its security stance with 
the United Kingdom22 and the Five Eyes alliance. Yet 
the political and legal fallout from the Kim Dotcom 
raid has extended far beyond anything that could 
ever possibly have been imagined. 
What began as mutual assistance in law enforce-
ment for alleged intellectual property rights violations 
(which sparked the original police raid and seizure of 
Mega Upload) has ended in multiple investigations, 
revelations of spying, new laws, and a sea change 
in regulation affecting the internet in New Zealand. 
We have even seen the birth of a new political party, 
the Internet Party, founded by Mr Dotcom, which has 
formed an alliance with the Mana Party and is contest-
ing the general election in September 2014.23
But the pace of regulatory intervention, its tech-
nical aspects, and the intensely political nature of 
the proposals make it very difficult for many New 
Zealanders to engage meaningfully. More major law 
reforms were announced in May 2014, with a whole-
sale review of the Privacy Act which will include new 
measures for data sharing by government agencies, 
mandatory reporting of data breaches, and a new 
offence of impersonation. 
While this review is welcome, and there is a 
good Privacy Commissioner24 who has knowledge 
of internet-related issues, the policy review will 
also require close scrutiny and engagement from 
civil society groups. Legal academics are still only 
beginning to focus on surveillance and privacy25 
19 Cunliffe, D. (2014, March 9). Digital Bill of Rights. Labour. https://
www.labour.org.nz/media/digital-bill-rights  
20 internetrightsbill.org.nz/ten-internet-rights-and-freedoms 
21 internetrightsandprinciples.org/site/  
22 McCully, M. (2013, January 13). NZ-UK joint statement on cyber 
security. Beehive.govt.nz. www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-uk-
joint-statement-cyber-security  
23 Bennett, A. (2014, May 27). Mana confirms election year deal with 
Internet Party. New Zealand Herald. www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/
article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11262597  
24 Privacy Commissioner John Edwards: privacy.org.nz  
25 For example, the University of Otago held a symposium on 
Surveillance, Copyright and Privacy in January 2014: https://blogs.
otago.ac.nz/scpconf/programme-of-events/abstracts-of-talks 
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and in general the legal community has been slow 
to grasp the human rights implications of internet-
related policy and regulatory measures.
In some cases rights-affirming changes have 
been made to draft laws,26 but change is often diffi-
cult once laws are drafted because of political issues. 
In the case of the GCSB Bill, for example, it quickly 
became apparent that the government was unlikely 
to make major changes. Dunne, the politician who 
had refused to disclose his own communications 
to parliamentary investigators, ultimately voted for 
the GCSB Bill in a political deal widely condemned 
as a cynical “trade off for privacy”.27 His ministerial 
portfolio was later reinstated.28
In addition, the Kitteridge Report had found that the 
legal authority for collection of metadata was unclear 
and that it should be clarified. However, the govern-
ment declined to do so in the GCSB and TICS laws and 
instead went further, extending the powers of the GCSB 
and the legal regime for spying on New Zealanders.
The 13 Principles are being used to support ad-
vocacy and were referenced in submissions on the 
Harmful Digital Communications Bill.29 But while 
these have been helpful for civil society, it is difficult 
to see if these have had lasting impact in a coun-
try whose government’s foreign policy is so closely 
aligned to the Five Eyes alliance. One encouraging 
sign is that the Principles have been cited in the Inter-
net Party’s policy on privacy and internet freedom.30
New Zealand prides itself on its human rights 
reputation. But the reality is that our human rights 
online are more at risk. The result from these events 
is that threats to internet freedom have actually in-
creased: instead of curtailing the GCSB’s powers, 
new laws provide much stronger, direct state-sanc-
tioned surveillance (including the use of metadata) 
by the GCSB, which it can use in domestic law en-
forcement. In the public mind, significant issues of 
trust remain, but it is unclear how this might affect 
the 2014 national elections. 
New civil society voices have emerged in the last 
two years, but these groups need more support be-
cause the volume, speed and size of internet-related 
26 Tech Liberty. (2014, May 27). HDC Bill reported back by Select 
Committee. Tech Liberty. techliberty.org.nz/hdc-bill-reported-back-
by-the-select-committee 
27  National Business Review. (2014, August 14). Swing vote Dunne 
supports GCSB Bill after changing tune on domestic spying. National 
Business Review. www.nbr.co.nz/article/swing-vote-dunne-supports-
gcsb-bill-after-changing-tune-domestic-spying-peters-holds-out-ck-  
28  AAP. (2014, January 21). Leak forgotten, Dunne back as minister. 
MSN.nz. news.msn.co.nz/nationalnews/8787062/dunne-
reinstated-as-minister  
29 For example, by Tech Liberty: techliberty.org.nz/submission-
harmful-digital-communications-bill/#more-1968  
30  Internet Party, Privacy and Internet Freedom Policy, Clause 4.1.1. 
https://internet.org.nz 
policy is growing rapidly. In this environment, which 
is also highly politically charged, it is vital to have 
strong independent voices, and groups such as Tech 
Liberty are being increasingly called on to respond 
and help to inform public understanding and debate.
In a further development, in July 2014, the Unit-
ed Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
issued a damning report on issues of mass surveil-
lance. The report concluded that the collection of 
metadata is a violation of the right to privacy and 
human rights obligations apply without discrimi-
nation.31 It is unfortunate that the report was not 
available during the Kitteridge inquiry, which con-
cluded that the legality of metadata collection was 
unclear. But the clear and unequivocal UN report 
now needs to be followed up and actioned in New 
Zealand. Regular monitoring of New Zealand inter-
net freedom is also needed so that it can be available 
quickly to support advocacy when needed.32
Action steps
Tech Liberty is one of only a handful of New Zea-
land civil society groups and individuals working 
on internet-related human rights issues, including 
privacy and surveillance. Others include the New 
Zealand Council for Civil Liberties, New Zealand 
Law Society, and InternetNZ. As a voluntary group 
with limited resources, the task of monitoring and 
advocating is often difficult. More support and re-
sources are needed if the network of voices that has 
the capacity to engage in these important debates 
and activities is to be grown and strengthened. This 
includes the legal and academic communities.
Specific actions that need to be taken include:
• Support civil society advocacy efforts, including 
capacity building for those groups for whom in-
ternet-related human rights issues are still new.
• Regularly update the NZ internet freedom index33 
to enable periodic monitoring of threats to inter-
net freedom, and use these results in reporting 
on New Zealand’s human rights performance.
• Review, and where necessary amend, the GCSB 
and TICS Acts in light of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights report which 
finds, among other things, that collection of 
metadata is a violation of the right to privacy.
• Bring the New Zealand experience to the United 
Nations Human Rights Council session on the 
right to privacy in the digital age in September 
2014.
31 See also Association for Progressive Communications. (2014, July). 
Op. cit.
32  https://www.apc.org/en/irhr/i-freedom-nz/about
33  freedomindex.apc.org/index.php/Main_Page 
